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INTRODUCTION 
his Article documents the exercise of coercive power1 by public 
police services and private security companies in response to the 
needs of foreign-owned mining companies in an environment of social 
protest and opposition. It describes how a particular transnational private 
                                                                                                             
 *  B.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Saskatchewan), LL.M. (Osgoode), Doctoral Candidate, 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada, and Coordinator of the Justice and 
Corporate Accountability Project (“JCAP”). The empirical work that this Article is based 
on was funded in part by a grant from the Global Consortium for the Transformation of 
Security and by the Shin Imai Fund for Human Rights at Osgood Hall Law School. A 
translation of the previous version of this Article was published in 68 APUNTES: CENTRO 
DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL PACIFICO 63–108 (2011) (Peru). The Author 
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that made this research possible, and Jesica Karina Chuquilín Figueroa, for her indispens-
ible collaboration in the development of this project.  
 1. The term “coercive power” refers to two key sets of practices: (1) the armed pro-
tection of private and state property, and (2) practices of surveillance, harassment, and 
intimidation. 
T
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security company has been confronted with a broad international social 
movement of human rights and environmental activists who are simulta-
neously invoking multiple regimes of domestic and international law in 
an effort to hold the company to account for its actions. Peru offers an 
important case study with regard to these issues because it is a relatively 
poor developing country dominated by foreign-owned mining activity. 
Between 1990 and 2000, former president Alberto Fujimori initiated the 
neo-liberalization of the Peruvian economy2 through a series of political 
and economic legislative reforms that sought to integrate the country into 
the global economy and reduce the presence of the state in all areas of 
economic and social policy.3 In terms of the resource extraction sector,4 
this included the complete privatization of mineral production5 and the 
restructuring of the country’s legal regimes to create favorable conditions 
for foreign investors. As a result, in 2001 the International Monetary 
Fund evaluated Peru as one of the national economies most open to for-
eign investment in the world.6 Following the fall of Fujimori in 2000, 
subsequent governments7 advanced policies that continued the neo-
liberalization of Peru’s economic and legal order.8 By 2006, Peru was 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Kurt Gerhard Weyland, Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A 
Mixed Record, 46 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y, Spring 2004, at 135–41. 
 3. Jeffery Bury, Neoliberalismo, Minería y Cambios Rurales en Cajamarca [Neolib-
eralism, Mining and Rural Change in Cajamarca], in ANTHONY BEBBINGTON, MINERÍA, 
MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES Y RESPUESTAS CAMPESINAS [MINING, RURAL SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AND ANSWERS] 49, 50–56 (2007). 
 4. The term “resource extraction sector” refers to the economic actors and activities 
that extract resources such as minerals, oil, natural gas, or lumber from the natural envi-
ronment. 
 5. State control of mineral production declined from half to approximately one per-
cent of total production. David Szablowski, Mining, Displacement and the World Bank: 
A Case Analysis of Compania Minera Antamina’s Operations in Peru, 39 J. BUS. ETHICS 
247, 258 (2002). 
 6. Bury, supra note 3, at 58–59. 
 7. This trend ostensibly changed in 2011 when Ollanta Humala was elected Presi-
dent of Peru on a platform that promised to introduce regulatory measures to promote a 
more equitable distribution of wealth, especially in the area of resource extraction. Steph-
anie Boyd, Business as Usual: Peru’s New President Leaps to the Right, NEW 
INTERNATIONALIST MAG. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.newint.org/features/web-
exclusive/2011/12/07/peru-new-president-mine-strikes. However, by the close of 2011, 
Humala was already a major disappointment to his supporters on the political left due to 
his militarized response to social protests and his stance in favor of controversial resource 
extraction projects. Id. 
 8. For an overview of the reforms introduced by subsequent governments in the area 
of land law, see Pedro Castillo Castañeda, El Derecho a la Tierra y los Acuerdos Inter-
nacionales: el Caso de Perú [Land Rights and International Agreements: The Case of 
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one of the top mineral producing countries on the globe, with net project 
profits in the mostly foreign-owned mining sector totaling over seven 
billion dollars.9 
A record level of social and environmental conflict matches these rec-
ord profits.10 The majority of resource extraction conflicts relate to min-
ing activities11 and many of Peru’s six thousand “Campesino Communi-
ties”12 own or occupy land in areas affected by mining.13 These Commu-
nities are recognized in a legislative and constitutional framework that 
                                                                                                             
Peru] CEPES (Oct. 2009), http://www.cepes.org.pe/apc-aa/archivos-
aa/a01e3bc3e44a89cf3cd03d717396a20e/El_Derecho_a_la_tierra.pdf. 
 9. Alfredo C. Gurmendi, The Mineral Industry of Peru, in 2006 MINERALS 
YEARBOOK: PERU 15.1 (U.S. Dep’t Interior & U.S. Geological Survey eds., 2009), avail-
able at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-pe.pdf. 
 10. Anthony J. Bebbington & Jeffrey T. Bury, Institutional Challenges for Mining 
and Sustainability in Peru, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17296, 17296 (2009) (“In 2007, 
the Peruvian Ombudsman’s office recorded 78 conflicts in the country, 37 of which were 
socio-environmental in kind, and 33 related to mining; by 2009, it recorded 250 conflicts, 
of which 125 were socio-environmental in kind, and 89 related to mining.”); see, e.g., 
Franklin Briceno, Peru Cancels Mine After Police Kill 6 Protesters, Wound 30, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 23, 2011, 11:34 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/25/peru-mine-protest-santa-ana-bear-
creek_n_884587.html?view=screen; Rory Carroll, Peru Declares Curfew after Bloody 
Clashes in Amazon Jungle, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009, at 17; Simon Romero, As China 
Expands in Latin America, Tensions Fester At Its Mining Ventures in Peru, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 2010, at A6; John Vidal, ‘We Are Fighting For Our Lives and Our Dignity’: 
Across the Globe, as Mining and Oil Firms Race For Dwindling Resources, Indigenous 
Peoples Are Battling To Defend Their Lands—Often Paying the Ultimate Price, 
GUARDIAN, June 12, 2009, at 26; Clash Over Peru Irrigation Project Kills One, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, at A8; Ruth Collins, The Spoils of Peru’s Mines: Peru is Profiting 
from Mineral Wealth, But Risks Foreign Investors Riding Roughshod Over the Rights of 
Indigenous Andean Peoples, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/aug/31/peru-mining-
indigenous-rights. 
 11. This is as opposed to hydrocarbon extraction, forestry, or other resource extrac-
tion activities. See DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO, INFORME EXTRAORDINARIO: LOS 




 12. The term Campesino Community was introduced in 1969 to replace the term 
“Indigenous Communities” in reference to those communities that live primarily in the 
Peruvian Andes. Decreto Ley No. 17716, Ley de Reforma Agraria [Agrarian Reform 
Law] ch. III, DIARIO OFICIAL EL PERUANO [EL PERUANO], 25 June 1969 (Peru), available 
at http://sisbib.unmsm.edu.pe/bibvirtualdata/libros/2007/legis_per/cap03.pdf. 
 13. ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET AL., PERU SUPPORT GRP., MINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
PERU: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RIO BLANCO PROJECT, PIURA, at iv (2007) [here-
inafter BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU].  
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establishes communal property rights, autonomous communal self-
government, and protected cultural institutions.14 As such, two common 
issues underlie many of the conflicts between Campesino communities 
and mining companies: the question of whether or not the affected com-
munities consented to mining development and the concern that the 
wealth generated by mining has not sufficiently benefited local commu-
nities.15 
In the face of widespread organized opposition to mining, transnational 
companies increasingly employ a mix of public police services and pri-
vate security companies to protect their investment interests.16 These 
                                                                                                             
 14. Decreto Supremo No. 37-70-AG, Estatuto Especial de Comunidades Campesinas 
[Special Statute for Campasino Communities] 17 Feb. 1970 (Peru), available at 
http://sisbib.unmsm.edu.pe/bibvirtual/libros/2007/legis_per/contenido.htm; Ley No. 
24656, 13 Apr. 1987, Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas [General Law of Cam-
pesino Communities] EL PERUANO, 14 Apr. 1987 (Peru), available at 
http://www.cepes.org.pe/legisla/ley24656.htm; Ley No. 24657, 13 Apr. 1987, Declaran 
de Necesidad Nacional e Interes Social el Deslinde y la Titulacion del Territorio de las 
Comunidades Campesinas [Declaration of the National Need and Social Interest of the 
Territory of the Campesino Communities] EL PERUANO, 14 Apr. 1987 (Peru), available 
at http://www.cepes.org.pe/legisla/ley24657.htm. 
 15. These issues have been central to each of the high profile mining related conflicts 
in Peru in the recent years including the Tambogrande conflict in 2002, see Boyd, supra 
note 7; José de Echave, Canadian Mining Companies Investments in Peru: The Tam-
bogrande Case and the Need to Implement Reforms, COOPERACCION, secs. 1–3 (Frank 
Berinstein trans., Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/miningwatch.ca/files/Peru_case_study_0.pdf, the 
Quilish conflict in 2004, see THE DEVIL OPERATION (Guarango Cine y Video 2010), the 
Majaz conflict in 2005 and 2006, see Paola Tejada, [Interview] A Closer Look into the 
Minera Majaz Mining Conflict, INDYMEDIA.BE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2007, 5:54 PM), 
http://www.indymedia.be/index.html%3Fq=node%252F8365.html, the Combayo conflict 
in 2006, see Milagros Salazar, Leaching Out the Water with the Gold, IPS NEWS (Sept. 
30, 2006), http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34805, and the Bagua conflict in 
2009, see Naomi Mapstone, Bagua’s Indigenous Protest One Year Later, AM. Q. BLOG 
(June 7, 2010), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1588. 
 16. Mauricio Lazala, Private Military and Security Companies and their Impacts on 
Human Rights in Contexts Other Than War, Conference on Private Military Contractors 
in Latin America at the Havens Center (Jan. 2008), available at 
www.havenscenter.org/files/Lazala%20Paper_0.doc; see Chairperson-Rapporteur of the 
Working Grp. on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights & Im-
peding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Rep. on the Mission to 
Peru, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2008) (by 
José Luis Gómez del Prado) [hereinafter Rep. on the Mission to Peru], available at 
http://www.unwg.rapn.ru/en/4/Country%20Visits/G0810419.pdf; Charis Kamphuis, 
Derecho y la Convergencia del Poder Público y el Poder Empresarial: La Desposesión 
Campesina y La Coerción Privatizada en el Perú, 15 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE 
DERECHO SOCIAL (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Kamphuis, Derecho y la Convergencia 
del Poder Público y el Poder Empresarial]. See generally Fred Schreier & Marina Capa-
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practices, and their interface with international and domestic law, are 
examined in this Article. The Introduction begins with an analytical de-
scription of the domestic legal regime that structures security services in 
Peru. In this context, a case study of Forza is undertaken.17 This section 
presents the allegations raised against Forza in three on-going cases: 
Majaz,18 GRUFIDES,19 and Business Track.20 These cases depict the 
deep interpenetration of the economic and political power of foreign-
owned mining companies, Forza, and the Peruvian justice system.21 By 
tracing the legal trajectories of each case, this Article reveals a pattern of 
impunity for foreign investors and their security companies. 
Taking the discrete empirical context of the Forza case study as its ref-
erence, Part II studies impunity’s legal contours by questioning how it is 
constituted in the midst of multiple systems of international and domestic 
law. At the domestic level, it discusses the legal mechanisms that have 
jurisdiction over the transnational actors profiled in the Forza case study. 
At the international level, it considers three distinct normative systems: 
public international human rights law, private international foreign in-
vestment law, and corporate social responsibility mechanisms. This 
overview provides insight into how the global gap22 in the domestic regu-
lation of the transnational corporation and the enforcement of domestic 
                                                                                                             
rini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice, and Governance of Private Military and Securi-
ty Companies 39 (Geneva Ctr. Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Rep. 
No. 6, Mar. 2005) (listing how private security companies are employed to guard mines 
in many countries). 
 17. Forza is one of Peru’s oldest and most powerful private security companies, re-
cently purchased by Securitas, a transnational security services corporation. See infra 
notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Tejada, supra note 15. 
 19. See THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15. 
 20. See Ministerio Publico Fiscalía Superior Especializada en Criminalidad Organi-
zada [Prosecutor’s Office Organized Crime Specialist], Exp. No. 527–2009, Delitos: 
Interceptión Telefónica, Violacion de Correspondencia y Asociación Ilícita para Delin-
quir, a Señor Presidente (Jan. 27, 2011) (Peru), available at 
http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/webpanel/doc_int/doc17032011-165221.pdf [hereinafter 
Peru Prosecutor’s Office]. 
 21. See, e.g., THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15. 
 22. The regulation of the corporation by states around the globe is uneven, such that 
in some spaces and places the corporation is subjected to effective regulation and en-
forcement, and in others regulation is weak, ineffective, or lacking. The effect is to pro-
duces “gaps” or zones across the globe where the corporation is regulated to a lesser de-
gree by the state. Another term used to describe the same phenomena is “regime deficit.” 
See Shedrack Agbakwa, A Line in the Sand: International (Dis)Order and the Impunity of 
Non-State Corporate Actors in the Developing World, in THE THIRD WORLD AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION (Antony Anghie et al. eds., 
2003). 
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law, together with asymmetry in the enforcement of international law, 
function together to institutionalize and internationalize impunity in the 
Forza case study. 
In view of the stark—and apparently totalizing—nature of the system 
of impunity described in Part II, this Article concludes by exploring the 
potential value of its own methodological approach. With this objective, 
Part III revisits the Forza case study in terms of a methodology of inter-
national lawyering and legal academic work on the issue of corporate 
impunity. The approach responds to some of the imperatives of certain 
critical international law scholars23 and, most importantly, to the practical 
needs of social movements adversely affected by the privatization of co-
ercive force in favor of foreign investors. This focus ultimately invites 
advocates to contemplate the possibility that the invocation of voluntary 
corporate social responsibility mechanisms may risk broader political 
pitfalls. 
I. TRANSNATIONAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION AND THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF COERCION 
A. Domestic Legal Framework and Practice 
Academics doing research in diverse contexts have widely observed 
that the proliferation of private security companies is one consequence 
that flows from neoliberal law and policy reform and the reduction of 
public expenditure.24 The findings of a recent report issued by a United 
Nations Working Group (“UNWG”)25 suggest that this hypothesis is 
supported by the Peruvian experience.26 Since sweeping neoliberal policy 
reforms were introduced in Peru in the early 1990s, the State has not in-
                                                                                                             
 23. The specific authors referenced in Part III are Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Bhupinder 
Chimni, Martti Koskenniemi, and David Kennedy. 
 24. Bonnie Campbell, Good Governance, Security and Mining in Africa, 21 MINS. & 
ENERGY–RAW MATERIALS REP. 31, 35–37 (2006); Alexis P. Kontos, ‘Private’ Security 
Guards: Privatized Force and State Responsibility under International Human Rights 
Law, 4 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 199, 199–200 (2004) [hereinafter Kontos, ‘Private’ 
Security Guards]; Mark Ungar, The Privatization of Citizen Security in Latin America: 
From Elite Guards to Neighborhood Vigilantes, 34 SOC. JUST. 20, 20 (2007); Robert P. 
Weiss, From Cowboy Detectives to Soldiers of Fortune: Private Security Contracting 
and Its Contradictions on the New Frontiers of Capitalist Expansion, 34 SOC. JUST. 1, 8, 
9 (2007). 
 25. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 16. 
 26. See generally Kontos, ‘Private’ Security Guards, supra note 24, at 199; Ungar, 
supra note 24, at 20. 
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creased the ranks of the public police force, while conversely the number 
of private security personnel has expanded tremendously.27 
The United Nations (“UN”) study estimated that in 2008 there were 
100,000 private security guards in Peru, outnumbering the 92,000 public 
police officers.28 It also concluded that approximately half of the private 
security guards in Peru work for companies in the informal sector.29 
While the report itself does not define the term “informal,” it can reason-
ably be assumed that the term refers to companies that have not regis-
tered their operations with the appropriate ministry. If this is the case, 
these companies essentially operate illegally, given that the applicable 
legislation requires registration.30 The possibility that approximately half 
of the private security sector in Peru operates informally, and perhaps 
even illegally, suggests that the State may be either unable or unwilling 
to exercise effective regulatory control over the sector.31 
The lack of formal regulatory control over the private security sector is 
contrasted by the UNWG study’s observation of the close informal rela-
tionship between the private security sector, the police force, and the mil-
itary: 
In many cases, these companies are run by former members of the 
Armed Forces or the Police, or they occupy senior positions. Peru also 
seems to experience the “revolving door” syndrome whereby, when 
they retire, members of the military and police are hired by private se-
curity companies or start their own. The Ministry of the Interior appar-
ently authorizes these companies to hire off-duty police officers to pro-
tect buildings; the officer’s weapon is the property of the police, not of 
the company.32 
Thus it would appear that the private security industry in Peru is defined, 
rather ironically, first, by its high degree of illegality and second, by its 
close, informal relationship with the military and the police. 
In this context, the relevant provisions of the corresponding Peruvian 
legal regime are pertinent. In 1994, Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms includ-
ed the introduction of Peru’s first law with the stated objective of regulat-
                                                                                                             
 27. See Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, ¶¶ 37, 39, 40, 44. 
 28. Id. ¶¶ 40, 44. 
 29. Id. ¶ 12. 
 30. All private security companies must register themselves in accordance with an 
array of administrative specifications. See Ley No. 28879, 17 Aug. 2006, Ley de Ser-
vicios de Seguridad Privada [Private Security Services Act] arts. 4, 23, EL PERUANO, 18 
Aug. 2006 (Peru) [hereinafter Private Security Services Act (Peru)]. 
 31. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, ¶¶ 12, 44. 
 32. Id. ¶ 40. 
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ing the private security services.33 In 2006 the Private Security Services 
Act34 (“the Act”) replaced the initial 1994 law to form the current legisla-
tive context.35 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Act facilitates police and military offic-
ers’ access to employment in the private security sector.36 The Ministry 
of the Interior is responsible for the regulation, control, and supervision 
of all three institutions37 and authorizes the operation of privately owned 
Private Security Training Centers, which security personnel are required 
to attend.38 However, police or military officers may bypass this training 
requirement because Centers are empowered to recognize the equivalen-
cy of police or military training.39 The Act explicitly allows retired mili-
tary or police officers to supervise private security companies40 and does 
not prohibit these companies from employing actively serving po-
lice/military officers.41 
While the Act facilitates the integration of the public security labor 
force into the private sector, it nonetheless imposes a certain division of 
labor on these officers as they cross between private and publicly paid 
positions.42 Private security companies are prohibited from performing 
functions within the jurisdiction of the military or the police, such as the 
investigation of crime and espionage.43 However, despite this prohibi-
tion, in exceptional circumstances, private security officers may be re-
quired to support, collaborate with, and help the police force.44 However, 
when doing so, the Act stipulates that these private officers do not ac-
quire the legal status of public authorities.45 
The privatization of the Peruvian police force extends beyond the pa-
rameters of the Act. In 2009, a regulation was introduced by the national 
legislature that allows the National Director of the police force to enter 
into service provision agreements with private institutions, including 
                                                                                                             
 33. See Decreto Supremo No. 005-94-IN, 12 May 1994, Aprueban el Reglamento de 
Servicios de Seguridad Privada [Approval of the Regulation of Private Security Ser-
vices], ch. XIII, EL PERUANO, 13 May 1994 (Peru). 
 34. Private Security Services Act (Peru), supra note 30. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. art. 3. 
 38. Id. art. 23.1(e). 
 39. Id. art. 27.3. 
 40. Id. art. 27.2. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. arts. 24(c)–(e), 29. 
 44. Id. art. 38. 
 45. Id. arts. 23.1(j), 28, 38. 
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transnational mining companies.46 These agreements provide a frame-
work whereby individual police officers provide services to private com-
panies on their days off.47 
The Peruvian National Police force’s website displays a scanned copy 
of one such agreement.48 It is a 2009 contract signed by the General of 
the National Police Force and a representative of the Japanese-owned 
Santa Luisa Mining Company.49 However, since this is the only publicly 
available copy of an agreement of this type, it is difficult to determine 
how widespread these agreements are in the extractive industry. The in-
formation gathered in an ongoing journalistic investigation50 suggests 
that between 2008 and 2010 approximately thirty-three such agreements 
between the police force and transnational mining companies were in 
place across Peru.51 The terms of the agreements collected in this jour-
nalistic investigation52 are similar to those of the Santa Luisa agreement, 
described below, and they also coincide with what is publicly known 
                                                                                                             
 46. Decreto Supremo No. 004-2009-IN, 11 July 2009, Decreto Supremo que Aprueba 
el Reglamento de Prestacion de Servicios Extraordinarios Complementarios a la Funcion 
Policial [Supreme Decree that Approves the Regulation of the Provision of Services that 
are Exceptional and Complimentary to Police Duties] arts. 1, 4, 5 (Peru), available at 
http://www.mininter.gob.pe/admin/archivos/legales/13122009222005_reglamento_funcio
n_policial.pdf. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., Convenio De Cooperación para la prestación de Servicios Extraordinar-
ios Complementarios a la Función Policial entre la compañía Minera Santa Luisa S.A. y 
La Policía Nacional Del Perú [Cooperation Agreement between Mining Company Santa 
Luisa S.A. and the Peruvian National Police Force for the Provision of Services that are 
Exceptional and Complimentary to Police Duties], para. 4.1.2 [hereinafter Santa Luisa 
Agreement], available at 
http://www.pnp.gob.pe/transparencia/documentos/CONVENIO%20STA%20LUISA&20
SA%20–%20PNP.pdf. 
 49. Compañía Minera Santa Luisa S.A. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsui Min-
ing & Smelting Co. Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan. Cia Minera Santa Luisa S.A., DATOSPERU.ORG, 
http://www.datosperu.org/peru-cia-minera-santa-luisa-sa.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
It carries out zinc and lead mining activities in the Andean region of Ancash. Id. 
 50. Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48. 
 51. Jacqueline Fowks, IDL REPORTERO, http://idl-reporteros.pe/ (forthcoming). The 
author has copies of seven such agreements between mining companies and the police 
force on file. Agreements between Peruvian National Police and Industrias Cachimayo, 
S.A. (Oct. 23, 2007 & Oct. 24, 2009), Minera Yanacocha, S.R.L. (June 13, 2009), La 
Empresa Minera Sougang Hierro Peru, S.A.A. (Oct. 21, 2009); Compañía Minera An-
tamina, S.A. (July 1, 2009), La Empresa Conirsa, S.A (July 10, 2006), and Gold Fields 
La Cima, S.A. (Jan. 11, 2010) (on file with author). 
 52. Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48. 
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about other arrangements of its kind.53 As such, it would seem that the 
Santa Luisa agreement is at least somewhat representative of the general 
nature of the agreements being made between police and mining compa-
nies in Peru. 
The Santa Luisa agreement, entitled “Cooperation Agreement for the 
Provision of Services that are Exceptional and Complementary to Police 
Duties,” founds its existence on the constitutional duty of the police force 
to “maintain order”54 and has three named objectives. First, it aims to 
offer Santa Luisa “exceptional police services, complementary to [ordi-
nary] police duties, utilizing the human resources of the Peruvian Na-
tional Police.”55 Second, the police are to “detect and neutralize” any 
risks that threaten the personnel or property of the mining company,56 
therefore guaranteeing the normal development of mining activities. 
Third, the agreement serves to generate the financial and logistical sup-
port that the police force requires to fulfill its institutional goals in ser-
vice of the wider community.57 The agreement is drafted like a private 
contract in that it contains a privative clause specifically stating that con-
troversies are to be resolved directly between the parties.58 
In this framework, the police force commits to providing the mining 
company with officers from the Special Operations Division, which is 
notable for the reason that this division is trained to lead operations 
against drug trafficking, subversion, and violent conflict.59 The commit-
                                                                                                             
 53. The terms of the Santa Luisa agreement coincide with a description of Yanaco-
cha’s agreement with the police force. Compare GINO COSTA, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 
OF MINERA YANACOCHA’S POLICIES BASED ON THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2009) (describing terms of the agreement between the police 
force and Yanacocha), with Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48 (actual terms of the 
agreement between the Santa Luisa Mining Company and the police force). 
 54. Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48, paras. 1.2, 2, 3, 3.1, 3.2. The fundamental 
objective of the National Police is to guarantee, maintain, and reestablish the internal 
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servance of the laws and the security of private and public property; to prevent, investi-
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PERÚ [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU] [C.P.], Dec. 29, 1993, art. 166, translated at 
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/_ingles/CONSTITUTION_29_08_08.pdf. 
 55. “Exceptional police services, complementary to [ordinary] police duties, utilizing 
the human resources of the Peruvian National Police” is the author’s translation of the 
Spanish phrase “servicio policial extraordinario complementario a la función policial con 
los recursos humanos de la Policía Nacional del Perú,” appearing in the Santa Luisa 
Agreement. See Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48, para. 2. 
 56. Id. para. 3.1. 
 57. Id. para. 3.2. 
 58. Id. para. 8. 
 59. Id. paras. 3.1, 4.1.2. 
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ment on the part of the police force is to furnish the company with a ro-
tating force of uniformed and armed off-duty police officers to protect 
the mine site twenty-four hours a day.60 In exchange, the mining compa-
ny agrees to provide the off-duty officers with residence, food, life insur-
ance, health care, and a daily salary.61 Further, the company provides the 
police force as an institution with two different types of financial pay-
ments.62 The first is equivalent to twenty percent of the total salaries paid 
to individual officers,63 and the second constitutes an unspecified amount 
designated to assist the police force in the fulfillment of its overall insti-
tutional objectives.64 
To date, the constitutionality of the privatized funding and service ar-
rangements described above remains unscrutinized by academics and 
activists alike. The Peruvian Constitution states that the funds designated 
for police force logistics must be used exclusively toward institutional 
ends under the control of the designated public authority.65 It is unclear 
that the “exceptional” services offered to Santa Luisa fall within the 
scope of the “institutional ends” contemplated by the Constitution, which 
include offering protection and help to people and to the community.66 
According to one Peruvian law professor’s reading of the Constitution, 
an agreement of this nature violates the rights of all Peruvians to equal 
police protection and security to the extent that it compromises the con-
stitutional tenet that the exercise of police power must respect the princi-
ple of neutrality between institutions and sectors in society.67 
Taking into account the terms of the Santa Luisa agreement together 
with the findings of the UNWG study and the applicable legislative 
framework, some general conclusions can be drawn in regard to security 
in the Peruvian resource extraction context. First, it is clear that security 
services are being reorganized in accordance with a number of processes 
of privatization—in ways that are not yet fully understood. Second, law 
and practice facilitate the provision of a particular set of coercive re-
sources to transnational mining companies. These resources consist of 
private security companies that are staffed by former and active police 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. para. 4.1.3. 
 61. Id. paras. 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.5, 4.2.6. 
 62. Id. paras. 4.2.8, 4.2.10. 
 63. Id. para. 4.2.8. 
 64. Id. para. 4.2.10. 
 65. C.P. art. 170 (Peru). 
 66. Id. arts. 166, 170. 
 67. Pedro P. Grandez Castro, El Derecho a la Seguridad Ciudadana y los Procesos 
de Privatización en el Perú: Un Acercamiento Conceptual, GCST: NEW VOICES SERIES 
(forthcoming) (on file with the author). 
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and military personnel. Further, these resources include fleets of off-duty 
police officers organized to function like a private security force pursuant 
to private agreements. Third, public security institutions have adapted 
their policies and practices to compensate for their apparent lack of pub-
lic funds. Peruvian law created mechanisms whereby mining companies 
may fund the police force as an institution and also supplement the in-
come of individual officers. 
These observations suggest that the police force, both as an institution 
and as a labor force, has been partially privatized in the service of mining 
companies. As described above, the demand generated by mining com-
panies for security services must be understood in the context of the 
widespread observation that the increase in resource extraction in Peru 
has encountered growing community-based opposition,68 or in the words 
of the Santa Luisa agreement, “risks.”69 In the course of these conflicts, 
companies—not communities—have the economic resources to generate 
a market demand for security services. Security services such as those 
offered in the Santa Luisa agreement are employed to physically protect 
the property of foreign investors. This is especially salient because the 
source of conflict between mining companies and communities often 
relates to the fundamental issue of land and land rights.70 
However, the UNWG recently tied security companies in Peru to a 
“new development.”71 Specifically, they have become implicated in the 
surveillance, coercion, harassment, and intimidation of human rights or-
ganizations with a particular focus on defending the economic, social, 
and environmental rights of mining-affected communities.72 Thus the 
coercive relationship between private security companies and communi-
ties has two dimensions, namely the classical function of protecting 
property, “new” practices of surveillance, and even political persecu-
                                                                                                             
 68. See BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13; José De Echave, 
Mining and Communities in Perú: Constructing a Framework for Decision-Making, in 
COMMUNITY RIGHTS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: CANADIAN MINING AND OIL 
COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICA 17, 17 (Liisa North, et al. eds., 2006). 
 69. See, e.g., Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48, para. 3.1. 
 70. See Kamphuis, Derecho y la Convergencia del Poder Público y el Poder Empre-
sarial, supra note 16; Carlos Meléndez Guerrero, Movilización sin Movimientos: El Caso 
de los Conflictos Entre Comunidades y la Empresa Minera Yanacocha en Cajamarca 
[Mobilization without Movement: The Case of Conflicts between Communities and the 
Mining Company Yanacocha in Cajamarca], in ROMERO GROMPONE & MARTIN TANAKA, 
ENTRE EL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO Y LA INSATISFACCIÓN SOCIAL: LAS PROTESTAS 
SOCIALES EN EL PERÚ ACTUAL [BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL 
DISSATISFACTION: SOCIAL PROTESTS IN PERU TODAY] 321 (2009). 
 71. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, ¶ 7. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 7, 48–49, 72. 
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tion.73 Further, there is a strong indication that these dimensions coexist 
with a third feature of private security services in the Peruvian extractive 
industry, namely that these services are linked to a coordinated coalition 
of foreign governments and transnational corporations who are con-
cerned with monitoring and strategically debilitating mining related so-
cial movements. This study of Forza, one of Peru’s most important and 
powerful security companies, allows for a detailed exploration of each of 
these three dimensions. 
B. Case Study: The Forza Security Company 
Forza was created in 1991 by retired personnel from the Peruvian 
Armed Forces who specialized in subversion and espionage work.74 For-
za’s objective is to offer complete corporate security services to diverse 
companies with a specialization in the industrial, mining, and energy sec-
tors.75 In addition to its work for transnational mining companies, For-
za’s clients span an impressive array of high-profile international organi-
zations, including the British Embassy, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the Standard Bank London Limited, as well as subsidiaries of Co-
caCola, Eli Lilly, and Hewlett Packard.76 As Forza became one of Peru’s 
most important and powerful private security companies, its status gar-
nered the interest of Securitas, one of the largest multinational private 
security corporation in the world.77 Due to Forza’s “prestige, experience 
                                                                                                             
 73. See id. ¶¶ 7, 41, 43, 46, 72. 
 74. Forza, S.A.: Private Company Snapshot, BLOOMBURG BUSINESSWEEK, 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=39129
768 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Edmundo Cruz & César Romero, Diablo, CAJAMARCA, 
http://www.cajamarca.de/mine/reglaje2.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 75. Securitas Perú, SECURITAS, http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/About-
Us/Securitas-Peru (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 76. SECURITAS AB, Securitas in brief, in SECURITAS ANNUAL REPORT 2010 (2010). 
Securitas services a wide range of customers in a variety of industries and cus-
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banks, shopping centers, hotels, manufacturing industries, mining industries, 
hospitals and residential areas to high-tech and IT companies. The size of the 
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Id. 
 77. Securitas has 12 percent of the global market share and employs over 240,000 
individuals to offer services in over 40 countries on every continent. Acerca de Securitas 
AB [About Securitas AB], SECURITAS, http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/About-
Us/Historia (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Company Profile: Securitas, APRODEX, 
http://www.aprodex.com/securitas-931-l.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 
Company Profile: Securitas]. 
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and position in the Peruvian market,” Securitas acquired Forza in 2007 as 
part of its expansion into Latin America.78 
Ironically, Forza’s power and status as the security company of choice 
in Peru for a significant number of international organizations and corpo-
rations seem to be proportionate to its growing reputation as a systematic 
human rights violator. The following section describes three ongoing 
legal proceedings that allege Forza systematically violated the human 
rights of activists and human rights defenders working on mining issues 
in Peru.79 The cases are presented in chronological order of the incidents 
they represent. 
1. Majaz: Protection of “Private” Property 
The Rio Blanco project, located in a “cloud forest” in the Peruvian 
Andes between 2,200 and 2,800 meters above sea level, is one of the 
largest undeveloped copper resources in the world.80 It has the potential 
to become one of the largest copper mines in South America and to cre-
ate momentum for the creation of a larger “mining district.”81 In 2003 the 
British company Monterrico Metals acquired the exploration rights to the 
Rio Blanco project.82 Monterrico began operations in Peru through its 
wholly owned subsidiary Minera Majaz, whose name has since been 
changed to Rio Blanco.83 In 2007 the Chinese conglomerate Xiamen Zi-
jin Tongguan Investment Development Company bought the capital 
share of Monterrico.84 
Majaz’s exploratory operations at the Rio Blanco site were conducted 
on the communally owned territory of two Campesino Communities.85 
These activities occurred without the permission of these Communities 
                                                                                                             
 78. Acerca de Securitas Perú [About Securitas Peru], SECURITAS, 
http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/About-Us/Securitas-Peru (last visited Feb. 3, 2012) 
[hereinafter About Securitas Peru]. 
 79. See Tejada, supra note 15; THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15; Peru Prosecu-
tor’s Office, supra note 20. 
 80. BEBBINGTON, ET AL., supra note 13, at iv, v, 15; Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals 
PLC, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475 [3] (Eng.). 
 81. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [3] (Eng.); BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. 
IN PERU, supra note 13, at iv. 
 82. Emily Russell, Monterrico Acquires 100% Interest in Rio Blanco, BUS. NEWS 
AM. (Peru) (Apr. 3, 2003, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/mining/Monterrico_acquires_100*_interest_in_Rio_Bl
anco. 
 83. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 15. 
 84. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [4] (Eng.). 
 85. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 15. 
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and in violation of Peruvian and international human rights law.86 Alt-
hough the affected Campesino Communities repeatedly and clearly noti-
fied state and mining authorities of their opposition to the project, these 
efforts were met with “profound deficiencies” on the part of national au-
thorities.87 In response to the extreme level of social conflict in the re-
gion, an independent delegation of UK experts—including one Member 
of Parliament—was created to engage in an in-depth evaluation of the 
social, political, cultural, environmental, and economic issues raised by 
the Rio Blanco project.88 The delegation concluded that “non-violent 
protest and the democratic process [had] completely failed local popula-
tions.”89 
In 2004 community members marched on the Rio Blanco mine site, 
and one Campesino was killed in a confrontation with police.90 No police 
officers have been prosecuted or found responsible for this death.91 A 
second march began in late July 2005 with the participation of between 
two and three thousand Campesino leaders and communal authorities 
from across the region.92 This march was initiated because mining au-
thorities failed to respond to an ultimatum from Communities demanding 
the cessation of exploration.93 Marchers referred to it as the “sacrifice 
march”94 because they walked for several days through difficult terrain 
toward the Rio Blanco mine site.95 The protesters marched unarmed and 
waving white flags,96 with the expectation of negotiating with a special 
high-level commission of civil society leaders to be flown in by helicop-
ter.97 The Ministry of Mining requested the formation of the commission 
in order to facilitate negotiations between marchers, Majaz, and state 
authorities.98 However, unexpectedly, the commission’s helicopter was 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at 24–25 (noting that this conclusion was reached in a report issued by the 
Peruvian Ombudsperson’s Office in April 2006). 
 87. Id. at vi, 51. 
 88. Id. at 20. 
 89. Id. at vi, 51. 
 90. Id. at 17. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 17, 18. 
 93. Id. at 17. 
 94. Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475, [15(i)] (Eng.). 
 95. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 18; Jennifer 
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 96. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(v)] (Eng.). 
 97. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at iv, 18; Guerrero, 
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grounded a short distance from the mine site and police prevented its 
members from proceeding to the site.99 
With the delegation grounded nearby, the marchers’ campsite was al-
legedly bombed with tear gas from helicopters and raided by Forza and 
police officers.100 Approximately twenty-eight Campesino leaders were 
detained and brought to the mine site.101 The shocking claims of these 
Campesinos regarding the ensuing events were finally substantiated over 
three years later when photographs depicting officers engaged in cruel 
acts of abuse and torture of the Campesino detainees102 were leaked to a 
national newspaper in late 2008 by an anonymous source.103 Officers 
bound the Campesinos, placed sacks over their heads, and forced them to 
walk barefoot.104 Their clothes were completely or partially removed and 
they were savagely beaten, tortured, subjected to tear gas, and deprived 
of food and water.105 One Campesino did not survive these events.106 
Two female detainees reported being subjected to sexual abuse.107 After 
three days of torture in captivity, the Campesino detainees were released 
and charged with crimes such as terrorism.108 
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ional Vería Torturas en Majaz [International Forum will Investigate Majaz Tortures], LA 
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In June 2008 a group of lawyers at the Peruvian NGO FEDEPAZ filed 
a complaint to the Prosecutions Office requesting an investigation of the 
Forza security officers, police officers, and mine officials allegedly re-
sponsible for the crimes committed against the detained Campesinos.109 
In spite of the supporting photographic evidence, the local prosecutor 
rejected the complaint and closed the investigation.110 This closure was 
successfully appealed and in April 2009 the Prosecutions Appeals Office 
ordered that the investigations be reopened.111 At this stage, a prominent 
national newspaper reported that the investigation and prosecution had 
been impeded by the refusal of the police force to provide the names of 
the officers who participated in the police operation in question, as well 
as the refusal of Majaz to provide a list of the mine staff—including For-
za personnel—on site at the time.112 
One year later, in April 2010, the local prosecutor closed the investiga-
tion for a second time.113 After another appeal, the Appeals Office again 
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ordered that the investigation be reopened in August 2010.114 The ap-
peals prosecutor pointed out that the local prosecutor had failed to take 
into consideration that the police officers detained the victims and sub-
jected them to torture and other crimes while carrying out a police opera-
tion that was likely previously planned by high level police Command-
ers.115 As of the writing of this article, the domestic investigation contin-
ues.116 
In 2009 the victims brought parallel proceedings against Monterrico 
and its Peruvian subsidiary before the English High Court.117 Their case 
alleged that the company’s directors, managers, and personnel directly 
participated in events related to the torture and detainment of the Cam-
pesino marchers.118 The victims claimed that Monterrico was liable under 
the British Private International Law Act119 for failing to fulfill its “re-
sponsibility for risk management.”120 They also claimed that both Mon-
terrico and its subsidiary were liable under the Peruvian Civil Code for 
culpable or intentional damages on the basis of willful misconduct, fail-
ure to take adequate steps to prevent known risks, and actions of their 
employees (vicariously), including Forza security guards.121 Finally, the 
victims made a claim for negligence.122 
The nature of Majaz’s security arrangement was a major issue of con-
tention in the UK action. It was clear that Majaz employed Forza to pro-
vide the Rio Blanco site with security services and that both Forza and 
police officers were at the mine site when the torture and abuse of protes-
tors occurred.123 The victims testified that both Forza officers and police 
officers participated in the acts of torture, detention, and cruelty.124 The 
company alleged that Forza officers refrained from such behavior and 
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that any wrongdoing was solely committed by police officers, for which 
the company was not liable.125 Unfortunately, it was difficult to identify 
the institutional identity of some of the officers on the basis of the photo-
graphic evidence because the officers were not always fully uniformed or 
their uniforms were not always fully visible.126 
In terms of the institutional relationship between the company and the 
police force, it is not known if Majaz had a security services agreement 
with the police such as the one described in the previous section.127 
However, at a minimum, the nature of police participation in the events 
described above suggests a relationship of informal collaboration.128 The 
company liaised with the police force to ensure the presence of hundreds 
of officers from the Special Operations Division to protect the Rio Blan-
co site.129 In a statement to the press, a police general declared that Majaz 
was not paying the police but that it was providing food and some trans-
portation.130 Finally, the detention of the Campesino marchers occurred 
on company property and officers allegedly used the company’s facilities 
to carry out the logistics and coordination related to the detention and 
torture.131 
When the UK proceedings began in June 2009, the Court imposed a 
worldwide freezing injunction to restrain Monterrico from removing any 
of its assets up to the value of just over £5 million from the jurisdic-
tion.132 In the months following, the Court held that the allegations 
against Monterrico for responsibility and participation in the brutality 
against the protestors constituted a “good arguable case”133 for the pur-
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poses of upholding the injunction.134 However in July of that year, before 
the October 2011 trial could take place, the claimants accepted an offer 
from the company of monetary compensation without admitting liability 
in return for the withdrawal of their claim.135 
2. GRUFIDES: Political Persecution of Mining Activists 
Minera Yanacocha, the largest gold mine in Latin America and one of 
the most profitable in the world,136 began operations in 1992 in the Ca-
jamarca region of the Peruvian Andes, located between 3,500 to 4,000 
meters above sea level.137 Yanacocha is owned and operated by three 
shareholders: the Peruvian Compañía de Minas Buenaventura and the 
International Finance Corporation each hold a minority interest, while 
the American Newmont Mining Corporation, the largest gold mining 
company in the world, is the majority shareholder.138 Yanacocha has em-
ployed Forza since 1993 as its exclusive private security company.139 
Yanacocha also has a confidential contract with the police force to pro-
vide security services similar to those described in the Santa Luisa 
agreement.140 
Like Majaz, Yanacocha also began its operations on the communally 
owned territory of a Campesino Community.141 There is strong evidence 
that Yanacocha acquired the portions of the land it now mines in viola-
tion of the Campesino Community’s land-rights protected by domestic 
and international law.142 In addition to the problematic legal and political 
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underpinnings of Yanacocha’s presence in the area,143 a recent study of 
the United Nations (“UN”) Economic Commission on Latin America and 
the Caribbean identified Yanacocha as one of the least successful indus-
trial clusters in terms of its contribution to local development.144 With 
these antecedents, it is not surprising that large-scale protests began in 
1999 against Yanacocha’s expansion.145 These protests were essentially 
grassroots uprisings of local Campesino Communities affected by Yana-
cocha’s activities.146 
Two of these high-profile protests are particularly relevant. In 2004, a 
Campesino-led general strike and road blockade occurred in the city of 
Cajamarca. Ten thousand urban and rural residents engaged in this sus-
tained protest for a period of two weeks.147 The size and strength of the 
protests eventually forced Yanacocha to withdraw its planned expansion 
to a nearby mountain called Quilish.148 In 2006, another protest against 
Yanacocha sparked in the rural area of Combayo.149 Approximately 100 
Campesinos blockaded Yanacocha’s use of a local highway while 500 
Campesinos protested peacefully in the town square.150 In response, 
Yanacocha deployed somewhere between 75 and 200 armed officers, 
consisting of a mixture of Forza officers and off-duty police officers in 
the employ of Yanacocha pursuant to a private agreement with the police 
force.151 In the first few days of what became weeks of protest, a Cam-
pesino protestor was shot and killed, allegedly by police officers in the 
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employ of Yanacocha.152 In an investigation of Forza’s warehouse, locat-
ed on Yanacocha’s property, authorities allegedly found “war ammuni-
tion.”153 The possession of military-like weapons and ammunition by 
private security companies is illegal under the Act154 and a violation of 
the Peruvian Constitution.155 
In each of the above instances of political deadlock between Campes-
ino protestors and Yanacocha, state officials called upon members of the 
local NGO GRUFIDES to mediate,156 with GRUFIDES earning the 2004 
National Prize in Human Rights for its role in contributing to the peace-
ful resolution of the Quilish conflict.157 However, the rise in Campesino 
organizing in Combayo in 2006 heralded the escalation of “Operación 
Diablo”—a systematic program of digital surveillance, intimidation, 
death threats, and defamation—which primarily targeted GRUFIDES 
personnel, but also spanned approximately thirty other related local envi-
ronmentalists and Campesino leaders.158 Later that same year, hit men 
murdered one of the Campesino leaders identified in the surveillance 
program as a “threat to Yanacocha.”159 
The Peruvian justice system has refused to prosecute the perpetrators 
of Operación Diablo.160 In 2009, GRUFIDES’ lawyers filed a petition 
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), al-
leging that the Peruvian State violated its obligations under the American 
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Convention on Human Rights to prevent and sanction these crimes.161 
The petition documents overwhelming evidence that Forza implemented 
Operación Diablo pursuant to its security services for Yanacocha.162 The 
evidence includes hundreds of photographs and surveillance reports, 
styled like those typically used by the police, which documented the ac-
tivities of GRUFIDES personnel and other activists.163 These reports and 
photographs were produced by employees of a subcontracted security 
company who directed this intelligence to a Forza manager “in accord-
ance with the terms of Operación Diablo.”164 Finally, there is documen-
tation of payment for service between Forza and personnel from the sub-
contracted company.165 The GRUFIDES petition also documents the 
specific acts of complicity of the Peruvian police force with Operación 
Diablo.166 The proceeding of the GRUFIDES petition in the Inter-
American system has been subjected to significant delay given that to 
date, three years after its submission, the IACHR has not made a deter-
mination regarding its admissibility.167 
3. Business Track: Coordinated Surveillance of Social Movements 
The theme of surveillance raised in GRUFIDES is further expanded in 
Business Track. Business Track was a private security company official-
ly registered in 2004 with the stated purpose of offering counterespio-
nage and information security such as debugging telephone lines and 
information technology systems.168 A retired military captain who served 
under the Fujimori regime founded the company, which employed active 
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and retired military officers.169 The clients listed on the Business Track 
website include oil, mining, and gas companies, as well as a number of 
private security firms—including Forza—that primarily provide security 
services to companies in these extractive industries.170 In early 2009, Pe-
ruvian authorities arrested Business Track managers and employees on 
charges of illegally tapping telephone conversations, bugging offices, 
and intercepting e-mail on behalf of third parties.171 
The illegal operation fell in the wake of an oil-kickback scandal.172 
Business Track allegedly recorded a discussion between a senior state 
official and a high profile lobbyist regarding payments in return for fa-
voring a Norwegian company’s bid in a petroleum exploration auction.173 
The contract was subsequently awarded to the same Norwegian compa-
ny.174 Business Track allegedly sold the recorded conversation to a com-
petitor company, which then leaked the audio file to the press.175 The 
scandal affected some of the highest officials in the Peruvian govern-
ment, and Business Track personnel were prosecuted.176 The illegal sur-
veillance company apparently made a political miscalculation in its pur-
suit of intelligence on behalf of transnational corporations.177 
Following the arrest of Business Track personnel, the prosecution be-
gan to obtain victim statements while it reviewed and cataloged the 
enormous quantity of audio and electronic recordings of email, tele-
phone, and web-based conversations that were confiscated from Business 
Track personnel.178 This process revealed that only about 20 percent of 
Business Track’s surveillance information related to possible criminal 
activity.179 The vast majority of the illegal surveillance targeted citizens 
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as well as private and public institutions in relation to questions of secu-
rity or matters of national interest.180 The evidence made public by the 
Court to date reveals that a significant number of the victims, from the 
1990s onward, were human rights activists, mining activists, and grass-
roots community organizations, as well as several lawyers’ collectives.181 
Among these individuals are the victims and advocates in the Majaz and 
GRUFIDES cases who were surveilled during the time period corre-
sponding to the issues in each case.182 Notably, the confiscated audio 
files date back to the early 1990s—during the Fujimori era—and contin-
ue through the present.183 On the basis of these dates, it appears that the 
military intelligence personnel who founded Business Track took their 
intelligence files with them upon retiring from military service after the 
fall of the Fujimori government. 
This helps to explain the observation of the International Working 
Group on Indigenous Affairs (“IWGIA”) that the scandal caused other-
wise opposing political forces to align in order to prevent an investiga-
tion into Business Track’s client base.184 The Fujimori political camp, the 
Alan García government, and at least some transnational companies op-
erating in the resource extraction industry have a shared political interest 
in curtailing an investigation into Business Track’s activities.185 As noted 
above, while the Business Track scandal first broke in relation to the ap-
parent corruption of the Alan García government in favor of a transna-
tional petroleum company, the confiscated files also included recordings 
of communications of civil society members made during the Fujimori 
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era through to the present.186 Thus Business Track is a stark example of 
how the political surveillance practices previously employed by a repres-
sive dictator can adapt to meet the needs of the transnational corporate 
sector when security services are privatized. 
The IWGIA’s concerns about the investigation in Business Track seem 
to have been proven. After almost a year and a half of reviewing Busi-
ness Track’s audio files, at the end of July 2010 the criminal court Judge 
issued her final decision regarding the judicial investigation.187 The 
1,135-page decision is essentially a recitation of the 1,300 pieces of evi-
dence reviewed.188 A key outcome of the report is the Judge’s refusal to 
authorize the Prosecutions Office to investigate the identity of Business 
Track’s clients—in other words, the individuals and institutions that paid 
for illegal telephone tapping and email hacking activities.189 Ironically, 
the Judge reasoned that such an investigation would be premature.190 As 
such, to date there is no indication that Business Track’s powerful cli-
ents, among them Forza and a number of transnational mining corpora-
tions, will be subject to a criminal investigation.191 
As indicated in the previous two sections, there are documented links 
between Business Track’s surveillance activities and Forza’s alleged role 
in human rights violations against mining activists in the Majaz192 and 
GRUFIDES cases.193 These links suggest that transnational mining and 
private security companies have formed a highly integrated network of 
surveillance and information exchange regarding civil society actors who 
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criticize their activities. There is also reason to believe that this infor-
mation may be used to facilitate the political persecution of these actors. 
For example, as detailed in the previous section, GRUFIDES alleges that 
Forza perpetrated Operación Diablo against local activists in the service 
of Yanacocha Mine.194 It is undisputed that, at the very least, Business 
Track tapped GRUFIDES’ phones during the height of Operación Dia-
blo.195 It is further documented that Forza was a client of Business 
Track.196 Thus, taking the above observations of the GRUFIDES and the 
Business Track cases into consideration, at least two strong inferences 
arise. First, there is reason to believe that Forza contracted Business 
Track pursuant to the security services it provides to Yanacocha. Second, 
there is a strong indication that the surveillance information collected by 
Business Track was ultimately used by Forza to advance the objectives 
of Operación Diablo, namely the persecution of activists working with 
communities negatively affected by Yanacocha’s mining activities.197 
Documents made public by WikiLeaks in late January 2011198 suggest 
that this network of surveillance is deeply integrated with key foreign 
embassies in Peru.199 The documents of interest are two U.S. embassy 
cables dated just after the events of Majaz that refer explicitly to the 
Majaz conflict.200 These cables communicated that the embassies of the 
United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, Switzerland and South 
Africa “stepped up” efforts to improve coordination with major foreign 
mining investors “with an eye to reducing anti-mining violence.”201 In-
deed, the “violence against British firm Majaz” had precipitated a meet-
ing hosted by the US and Canadian Ambassadors for representatives of 
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international mining companies, including Yanacocha Mine, which was 
later implicated in the GRUFIDES case.202 The objective of this meeting 
was to review companies’ operating difficulties in Peru and coordinate 
efforts to improve the investment climate.203 At this meeting, the Ambas-
sadors encouraged the companies to report NGO-funded groups or indi-
viduals “that advocate violence” so that the Ambassadors would be able 
to confront any NGOs from their respective countries.204 The mining ex-
ecutives suggested to the Ambassadors that they should meet with Peru-
vian and church officials to encourage them to rotate teachers and priests 
in and out of conflictive mining communities to ensure that any of these 
professionals with anti-mining sentiments would not stay too long in any 
given community. 205 When the contents of these cables are placed within 
the context of the Forza case study, they present a small glimpse of a 
web of high-level coordination between the representatives of foreign 
governments, the executives of transnational mining companies, and 
their private security companies.206 The explicit objective of this coordi-
nation is to criminalize, repress, surveil, and dismantle local social 
movements and their international supports that either critique and/or 
oppose particular mining projects in Peru. 207 
II. THE LEGAL ARRANGEMENT OF IMPUNITY 
To the extent that systems of international and national law fail to 
bring the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice, impunity be-
comes a legal and moral issue. The Forza case study tells a story of im-
punity for private security companies and public police officers working 
in the service of transnational mining companies in Peru. Impunity refers 
to the 
impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of viola-
tions to account [in legal proceedings for the reason that] they are not 
subject to an inquiry that might lead to their being . . . tried and, if 
found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to mak[e] repara-
tions to their victims.208 
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The following section reviews the de jure international and national 
systems of law that govern Forza, but that have been de facto ineffective 
in preventing or sanctioning the violations alleged in the above case 
study. This approach is undertaken on the basis of the premise that in 
order to confront impunity, justice advocates must begin with an empiri-
cal study of the legal mechanisms that exist in the midst of the circum-
stances of impunity. Fully examining the shortcomings of present ar-
rangements of law is a crucial first step toward meaningfully contributing 
to debates regarding law reform on the subject of transnational corpora-
tions and human rights. These debates are alive and well, and this issue 
has been extremely contentious at the international level. As a result, the 
UN’s pertinent agenda has been reincarnated into a radically different 
framework since its initial conceptualization in the early nineties.209 The 
most recent UN proposals have been the subject of a highly public, per-
sonal, and antagonistic exchange between UN Special Representative 
John Ruggie and a Senior Director at Amnesty International.210 The regu-
lation of the transnational corporation is most certainly an unresolved 
complex issue and the details of this law reform debate are undoubtedly 
far beyond the reach of this Article. However, the existence of this de-
bate is briefly referenced here in order to make the basic argument that 
                                                                                                             
 209. See, e.g., Annex: Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, Letter 
dated May 31, 1990 from the Chairman of the special session of the Comm’n on Transna-
tional Corporations to the President of the Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 
(May 31, 1990); Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Pro-
poses Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html; U.N. Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
gard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003); U.N. 
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2005/69, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, 61st Sess., Apr. 22, 2005, Econ. & Soc. Council, 61st 
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (Apr. 22, 2005) (creating the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Cor-
porations in 2005; renewed in 2008); Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/63/53 (June 
18, 2008), available at 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf. 
 210. Widney Brown, Letter to the Editor, Stronger UN draft on human rights abuses 
needed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at 10; John Ruggie, Letter to the Editor, Bizarre Re-
sponse by Human Rights Groups to UN Framework Plan, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at 
10; Hugh Williamson, Amnesty Criticises UN Framework for Multinationals, FT.COM 
(Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/36f72370-2226-11e0-b91a-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1bB2qL4Rx. 
558 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
empirical work, such as that undertaken in this Article, which analyzes 
the impunity of the transnational corporation in light of applicable sys-
tems of law, continues to have the potential to offer important insights to 
these broader international law and policy debates. This methodological 
point is revisited again in the Conclusion. 
A. Domestic Law: the Global Gap 
The legal system in Peru has failed to initiate proceedings against For-
za in any of the cases reviewed. This is arguably due to the limitations 
created by a politicized prosecutorial system in a context where there is 
very little political will to hold Forza to account. In the Majaz case, the 
criminal investigation of the police and Forza officers was only initiated 
under pressure from local human rights lawyers, and occurred over three 
years after the incidents.211 The prosecutor subsequently closed the inves-
tigation twice in spite of a preponderance of evidence. While the investi-
gation was reopened each time after appeals were made by local law-
yers—five years after the incidents of torture and abuse—the perpetra-
tors have yet to be charged or prosecuted.212 In GRUFIDES, the criminal 
investigation of Forza and Yanacocha followed a similar pattern, alt-
hough the appeals made by local lawyers against the prosecutor’s deci-
sion to close the investigation were ultimately unsuccessful.213 Finally, in 
Business Track, the institutions, such as Forza, that allegedly paid for the 
surveillance of mining activists, including activists involved in both 
Majaz and GRUFIDES, have yet to be officially named.214 Indeed, the 
Court has specifically decided not to investigate these institutions. 
In light of the apparent failure of the Peruvian justice system, and giv-
en that Forza’s operations in the cases at issue implicate corporate actors 
from a variety of jurisdictions, one must examine the capacity of other 
domestic systems to address the impunity alleged in the Forza case study. 
In the Majaz case, the rights to the Rio Blanco mine site have passed 
from a British company to a Chinese consortium.215 In GRUFIDES, an 
American company, a Peruvian company, and the International Finance 
Corporation (“IFC”) jointly own Yanacocha Mine.216 All of these com-
                                                                                                             
 211. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 212. See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 213. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 18. 
 214. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. 
 215. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 2, 20 n.32. 
 216. See Lerner Ghitis Calls for Further Dialogue to Resolve Protests, PERUVIAN 
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.peruviantimes.com/03/lerner-ghitis-calls-for-further-
dialogue-to-resolve-protests/14340. 
2012]FOREIGN INVESTMENT & PRIVITIZATION OF COERCION 559 
panies employ Forza, owned by the Swedish corporation Securitas.217 
Finally, Forza allegedly employed Business Track, a Peruvian compa-
ny.218 Thus, Forza’s alleged human rights violations are linked to the in-
terests of corporations based in at least five jurisdictions: Peru, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, the United States, China, and Sweden, as well as one truly 
international corporation, the IFC. A legal action against a multinational 
corporation in its home state is usually brought by way of a tort action, 
governed by either the common law or domestic legislation. However, 
notwithstanding the intersection of multiple domestic jurisdictions in the 
Forza study, there are significant obstacles to addressing the issue of cor-
porate impunity in the “home state” of these foreign investors. What fol-
lows is a brief consideration of the possibilities of home state litigation in 
two important jurisdictions: the United States and the United Kingdom. 
GRUFIDES could theoretically be brought to an American court under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”),219 although the litigants have yet 
to explore this option. It is well known that home state courts in Cana-
da220 and the United States221 tend to refuse to take jurisdiction over the 
harm investors have allegedly caused abroad, often due to a narrow ap-
plication of the international private law doctrine of forum non-
conveniens.222 In the United States, as of 2004 there were approximately 
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twelve active cases against corporate defendants under the ATCA, a 
handful of which survived a motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdic-
tion.223 Indeed, most of the ATCA cases against private corporations 
have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and none have resulted in a 
final judgment against a U.S. corporation.224 This indicates that on the 
few occasions that claims manage to survive a jurisdictional challenge, 
they are either dismissed later on other grounds or settled out of court.225 
Not surprisingly then, there have only been a handful of successful set-
tlements in cases brought under the ATCA for corporate human rights 
violations.226 Thus, to date, a resolution by way of a settlement is a com-
mon feature of every one of the few cases that have been successful un-
der the ATCA.227 
The application of tort law in the European Union (“EU”) is somewhat 
more favorable to the victims of human rights violations than in Canada 
and the United States, particularly regarding the doctrine of forum non-
conveniens.228 A decision of the European Court of Justice in 2005 de-
clared that the national courts of the EU may not halt proceedings on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens in cases brought against EU domiciled 
defendants, where the alternative venue is outside the EU.229 In this con-
text, the British High Court was required to take jurisdiction over the 
action in Majaz.230 However, the company nonetheless challenged the 
existence of a legal basis for liability in UK law.231 While the Court 
found that the claimants had an “arguable case” (a low threshold), it fur-
                                                                                                             
 223. Koh, supra note 222, at 298. 
 224. Id. at 269–70. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Settlement Statement, Ctr. for Const. Rights, Statement of the Plaintiffs’ Attor-
neys in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell, Wiwa v. Anderson, and Wiwa v. SPDC 2 (June 8, 
2009), available at  
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Wiwa_v_Shell_Statement_of_the_Attorneys-1.pdf. 
 227. Mara Theophila, Note, Moral Monsters under the Bed: Holding Corporations 
Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrole-
um Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2876 (2011). 
 228. Schutter, supra note 222, at 266–72. 
 229. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383, ¶¶ 40–46, available 
at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002CJ0281:EN:HTML; Rich-
ard Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinationals (“MNCs”) for Violation of Human 
Rights: An Overview of the Position outside the US, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. 
12–13, http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/richard-meeran-tort-
litigation-against-mncs-7-mar-2011.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Meeran, 
Tort Litigation against Multinationals]. 
 230. Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinationals, supra note 229, at 19. 
 231. See id. at 11–13. 
2012]FOREIGN INVESTMENT & PRIVITIZATION OF COERCION 561 
ther commented that the case undoubtedly had potential legal and factual 
weaknesses.232 While EU tort litigation against multinational companies 
occurs in a relatively favorable legal context, due to the commercial real-
ity of this litigation to date, no cases have been resolved on the merits or 
have resulted in a finding of liability against the corporation.233 Rather, 
among the few cases that have not been dismissed, most were resolved 
through private settlements.234 Majaz ultimately held true to this pattern 
when the claimants accepted a settlement offer in July 2011, two years 
after initiating proceedings.235 
This settlement pattern warrants further consideration of the dynamics 
and implications of private settlements. If an NGO is litigating the claim, 
settlement is often the only option.236 While NGOs generally do not stand 
to financially gain from settlement, they may lack the resources to pursue 
a trial, especially when litigation may promise to draw out over a period 
of decades.237 However, claimants are usually represented by law firms 
working for a substantial contingency fee.238 In these cases, settlement is 
likely the best business option for the firm.239 
Conveniently, Yanacocha offers an example of how such a settlement 
might play out.240 In 2009 Yanacocha paid $3,000,000 to settle an action 
brought to a U.S. District Court by the Municipality of Cajamarca in ref-
erence to a spill of 151 kilograms of mercury in the area that occurred in 
2000.241 The Municipality’s American lawyers took $1,200,000 of the 
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settlement pursuant to a contingency fee and a further $115,000 in addi-
tional general costs.242 The Municipality was left with about $1,685,000. 
This settlement—marked by significant controversy involving allega-
tions of fraud, misrepresentation, and incompetence against the Munici-
pality’s American lawyers and their Peruvian counterparts243—illustrates 
the serious ethical questions that can arise when elite (Northern) lawyers 
purport to represent marginalized communities in developing countries 
where there are few effective mechanisms of lawyer-client accountabil-
ity.244 
It is clear that, in addition to inherent financial challenges and doctrinal 
hurdles, an endemic feature of civil law home state litigation against cor-
porate defendants is the tendency to settle. A settlement is undoubtedly a 
positive achievement in the sense that it offers the victims some compen-
sation. However, as a systemic practice in response to corporate human 
rights violations, settlements have certain drawbacks. Settlements do not 
“bring the perpetrators to account in legal proceedings” as the definition 
of impunity presented above requires.245 Rather, settlements allow the 
alleged perpetrators to purchase their immunity from civil suits accord-
ing to the terms of secret private agreements. Further, due to the confi-
dential nature of settlements and the location of the proceedings in the 
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investor’s home country, the resolution of a case by way of a settlement 
undoubtedly militates against national or international public policy re-
form.246 Moreover, settlements deprive social movements of a court 
sanctioned public record of events that might bolster their moral and po-
litical claims for reform.247 For these reasons, private settlements can be 
seen as a means of privatizing the problem of impunity by converting the 
accountability of the perpetrators into a private matter and by limiting the 
impact of the proceedings on public policy and public action.248 
These observations raise serious questions about the capacity of home 
state litigation, at least in its present form, to address transnational corpo-
rate impunity and privatized coercion. It seems arguable that home state 
litigation is better positioned to maintain the status quo of impunity ra-
ther than change it.249 Further, the presence of Chinese investors in 
Majaz signals a new challenge created by the emerging shift in the char-
acter of the “home country.”250 Foreign investment increasingly origi-
nates in countries where there is very little history of home state litiga-
tion and where new, and as yet unexplored, legal challenges undoubtedly 
reside to transnational corporate accountability.251 For example, China 
has become the second largest foreign investor in Peru, and Peru is the 
number one destination in Latin America for Chinese investment.252 
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The above review depicts the global gap in domestic regulation and 
law enforcement with regard to transnational corporations. The gap re-
sults from an array of deficiencies, patterned along North and South 
lines. In the Forza case study, the Southern domestic jurisdiction (Peru) 
has failed to date to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over Forza, while 
the Northern jurisdictions pose formidable challenges to successful liti-
gation against the corporations involved.253 Taken together, these defi-
ciencies create a global gap in the domestic regulation of the transnation-
al corporation. As a result, even in the midst of domestic systems of law 
ostensibly available to address the alleged violations, the circumstances 
of impunity are maintained. The Forza case study suggests that the po-
tential for impunity is particularly heightened where transnational corpo-
rations avail themselves of privatized and internationalized sources of 
coercive power. The following section will examine the extent to which 
current international law mechanisms are capable of filling the global 
gap created by the deficiencies in domestic legal systems reviewed 
above. 
B. International Law: Asymmetrical Enforcement and Privatized Norm 
Development 
The Forza case study engages three key systems of international law: 
public international law, private international investment law, and private 
corporate social responsibility mechanisms.254 Each of these will be con-
sidered in turn. 
The two international public law human rights treaty administration 
systems of relevance to the study are the Organization of American 
States (“OAS”) system255 and the UN Human Rights Committee.256 Each 
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system has articulated norms relevant to the Forza case study. As a bed-
rock principle, both systems recognize that member states have a funda-
mental duty to appropriately prevent, investigate, and sanction all private 
and public actors that violate human rights within its territory.257 Further, 
both systems have declared that human rights violations occurring within 
a member state’s territory become the state’s responsibility under inter-
national law when the state fails to carry out its duty to prevent, investi-
gate, and sanction human rights violators.258 A study of the norms and 
jurisprudence in these two systems concluded that the privatization of the 
use of force traditionally associated with public law enforcement argua-
bly contravenes state obligations under international human rights trea-
ties and customary international human rights law.259 
There has been very little international public law jurisprudence that 
addresses human rights violations committed collectively by the state, 
private security actors, and transnational corporations.260 Nonetheless, in 
principle, the norms referenced above appear to confront the problem of 
impunity depicted in the Forza study. These norms require that the Peru-
vian State carry out the criminal investigation and prosecution of those 
responsible in the GRUFIDES and the Majaz cases. Further, these norms 
arguably establish that at least some elements of the various arrange-
ments of private security services used by mining companies in Peru are 
unlawful under international human rights law. 
In practice, however, both the OAS and the UN human rights treaty 
oversight systems lack enforcement capacity with regard to their state 
signatories.261 If either of these were to able to take jurisdiction and find 
a human rights treaty violation in relation to any of the allegations raised 
in the Forza case study, the recommended remedy would nonetheless 
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require voluntary implementation by the Peruvian State.262 This process 
is circular because it returns the analysis precisely to the originating 
problem—the Peruvian State’s explicit commitment to the privatization 
of security together with its evident lack of political will to address the 
human rights violations in the case study. It is widely acknowledged that 
the Inter-American system faces serious problems in achieving “mean-
ingful and lasting implementation” of its reparations orders.263 Even 
without taking into account the influence of powerful foreign investors 
and the dynamics of privatization, the obstacles to implementation have 
been identified by experts and scholars in the field as a lack of political 
will and the powerful position of the armed forces and the police in Latin 
American countries.264 
The current enforcement deficit inherent in public international human 
rights law is contrasted by the enforcement capacity of “international” 
foreign investment law.265 Bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) protect 
the interests of each of the foreign investors implicated in Forza’s alleged 
human rights abuses: the American company Newmont in Yanacocha;266 
the Swedish company Securitas in Forza;267 and formerly, the British 
company Monterrico in Rio Blanco.268 Yanacocha’s investors further 
benefit from a private investment contract.269 The terms of the applicable 
BITs create enforceable rights for investors through a system of interna-
tional private arbitration tribunals that can impose financial penalties on 
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the offending state.270 A study of the political consequences of the BITs 
applicable to four Andean countries, including Peru, highlighted the en-
forcement power of these treaties271 and concluded that they present ma-
jor fiscal risks to governmental decision-making in the extractive sector. 
This occurs because these treaties dramatically shift political bargaining 
power in favor of transnational firms and against other social interests 
that stand to benefit from efforts to regulate extractive industry inves-
tors.272 Since these BITs do not create any corresponding human rights 
responsibilities, they are unable to alleviate the problem of impunity in 
the Forza study. Rather, it is possible that the BITs may aid investors in 
resisting regulations aimed at addressing the conditions of impunity. In 
this light, BITs may well represent the privatization of the public power 
that could theoretically act to address impunity. 
Finally, Forza is indirectly governed by an emerging patchwork of pri-
vatized human rights norms.273 Forza’s multinational owner, Securitas, 
signed the UN Global Compact,274 a private-public policy initiative for 
businesses that are committed to aligning their operations with “ten uni-
versally accepted principles” in the areas of human rights, labor, envi-
ronment and anti-corruption.275 Pursuant to the Global Compact, Securi-
tas agreed that its business should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights and ensure that it is not complic-
it in human rights abuses.276 However, according to the UN Global Com-
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pact’s website, the compact is “voluntary and network based” and its 
“light and non-bureaucratic” governance framework is focused on pro-
moting corporations’ capacity to prospectively conform to the Global 
Compact.277 As such, this initiative offers no mechanism for addressing 
the criminal behavior of Forza officers alleged in the three cases re-
viewed.278 
Yanacocha, the mining company that employed Forza in relation to 
GRUFIDES, is governed by the most celebrated private human right 
mechanisms. Yanacocha’s majority shareholder, Newmont, has directly 
signed onto the UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, the 
Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights in the Extractive 
Industry (“Voluntary Principles”), and the Position Statement on Mining 
and Indigenous Peoples of the International Council on Mining and Met-
als (“ICMM”).279 Yanacocha is also governed by the corporate responsi-
bility regime of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (“OECD”), the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, because 
its majority shareholder, Newmont, is an American company.280 Finally, 
the human rights policies pertaining to the IFC are applicable because of 
the IFC’s share in Yanacocha.281 Of these mechanisms, the OECD,282 the 
ICMM,283 the Voluntary Principles,284 and the IFC285 permit the submis-
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sion of complaints. The outcomes of complaints made against Yanacocha 
under the Voluntary Principles and IFC mechanisms will be reviewed 
here. 
Since 2000, three complaints against Yanacocha have been filed with 
the IFC Office of Compliance/Advisor Ombudsmen (“CAO”).286 While 
these complaints do not directly relate to Forza, it is nonetheless instruc-
tive to evaluate how they have fared. In general, the complaints alleged 
that Yanacocha failed to fulfil its commitments to help the victims of a 
mercury spill287 and that the mine adversely affected local communities 
in a myriad of other ways.288 However, each of the three CAO com-
plaints brought against Yanacocha failed to proceed from an initial inves-
tigation to a conflict mediation phase289 and none of them entered the 
subsequent compliance or follow up phases of the CAO process.290 There 
is no indication from the information presented on the CAO website that 
the substance of the complaints were ever successfully addressed.291 By 
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August 2006, all three of the complaints had been closed without com-
ment or explanation.292 
In 2001, the CAO attempted to address two of the three complaints293 
through the creation of a “Dialogue Roundtable.”294 At the time, this ini-
tiative was a celebrated innovation for the CAO.295 Yet a 2005 independ-
ent evaluation of the Roundtable questioned its capacity to serve as a 
dispute resolution mechanism and observed that the Roundtable had 
failed to respond to a number of key conflicts in its midst.296 Due in part 
to this inaction, the evaluation concluded that the Roundtable had “never 
been able to gain the legitimacy and broad community acceptance that 
would enable it to [help ameliorate] the tension, distrust, and volatility 
that pervade the relationship” between Yanacocha and the community.297 
The conclusions of the 2005 evaluation are important because, at a min-
imum, to resolve the issue of impunity at the heart of the Forza case 
study, the CAO would have to engage in public fact finding and conflict 
mediation between GRUFIDES, Forza, and Yanacocha so that the perpe-
trators of the alleged violations would be “brought to account.”298 One 
glaring testament to the CAO’s unsatisfactory resolution of the three 
complaints against Yanacocha is the fact that in the wake of these com-
plaints, and their closure, the conflict escalated such that the events doc-
umented by GRUFIDES ensued. In 2004, and again in 2006, mass pro-
tests took place against Yanacocha, resulting in the death of a protestor, 
the murder of a Campesino leader, and the subsequent persecution of 
GRUFIDES personnel.299 
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The conduct of Yanacocha’s security forces during these events result-
ed in yet another voluntary human rights proceeding, initiated in 2007 by 
Oxfam America against Newmont under the Voluntary Principles for 
Security and Human Rights.300 This complaint was the first of its kind 
under the Voluntary Principles, and in response Newmont agreed to an 
independent review of Yanacocha’s security and human rights policies 
and procedures.301 The 2009 report of the independent reviewer302 rec-
ommended that Yanacocha create a Risk Assessment and Conflict Reso-
lution Office to “drastically investigate and sanction” violations of the 
Voluntary Principles and urge the justice system authorities to do the 
same.303 Further, it recommended that Yanacocha-paid police officers no 
longer carry firearms and that Yanacocha collaborate with the police 
force to train these officers to respect human rights.304 Finally, the review 
recommended the termination of Yanacocha’s contract of service with 
Forza.305 
A critical assessment of the independent review suggests that the ap-
peal to the Voluntary Principles failed to effectively address the issue of 
impunity and privatized coercion portrayed by the Forza case study.306 
First, the review failed to even mention the outstanding criminal allega-
tions against Forza raised by GRUFIDES and pertaining to Operación 
Diablo.307 Second, by failing to question Yanacocha’s economic support 
for the police force, the review did not adequately critique the model of 
privatized force.308 Rather, it further conflated the roles of Yanacocha 
and the justice system by suggesting that Yanacocha should take a role in 
the training of its police employees, and that Yanacocha should create an 
internal adjudication process for addressing criminal allegations against 
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its employees.309 Third, to the extent that the review made proposals that 
could partially address the issue of impunity or privatized force, these do 
not appear to have been implemented. In the time since the review was 
issued, there is no evidence that Yanacocha has prohibited its contracted 
police officers from carrying weapons, nor is there any indication that 
Yanacocha has terminated its contract with Forza. On the contrary, 
community members regularly observe that Yanacocha-paid police of-
ficers are armed, and that Forza officers continue in the employ of Yana-
cocha. Finally, there is no indication that the company has taken action to 
urge the authorities to investigate the criminal allegations raised in 
GRUFIDES, nor has it clarified its alleged role in Operación Diablo, 
either publicly or to the alleged victims of this operation. 
Turning to Majaz, the British company Monterrico was not governed 
by any of the corporate social responsibility mechanisms that Newmont 
has purported to adopt.310 As a junior mining company, Monterrico likely 
lacked the capacity to cultivate long-term relationships with local com-
munities.311 Junior mining companies generally have a short life span 
devoted to obtaining and selling mineral exploration rights.312 This is 
exactly the process that was followed in Majaz, Monterrico ultimately 
sold its interest in the Majaz project to a Chinese consortium.313 This 
consortium has likewise not signed onto any of the aforementioned inter-
national corporate social responsibility regimes.314 
The above discussion of the international law mechanisms applicable 
to the Forza case study highlights the asymmetry in the enforcement of 
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international law in favour of transnational corporate economic interests. 
The legal regimes, such as the BITS, in place to protect foreign invest-
ment interests are strong while the institutions that administer interna-
tional human rights conventions continue to lack enforcement capacity, 
particularly with regard to the activities of transnational corporations. In 
the Forza case study, the enforcement of these conventions continues to 
depend on the political will of the Peruvian State. 
The corporate social responsibility mechanisms that ostensibly govern 
the facts at issue in this case study have also been described above. Of 
these mechanisms, four would permit individuals or organizations to file 
a complaint in relation to Yanacocha315 and two have already been in-
voked to this end, namely, the Voluntary Principles and the IFC CAO. It 
is also noteworthy that these two mechanisms are arguably among the 
most robust of the applicable corporate social responsibility regimes. 
However, as discussed above, the appeals made to the Voluntary Princi-
ples and the IFC CAO regarding allegations against Yanacocha have 
produced very little in the way of concrete outcomes for the affected 
community members. In these specific circumstances, these two corpo-
rate social responsibility mechanisms have been unable to satisfy two 
key aspects of the definition of impunity, namely, they have not brought 
the perpetrators to account, nor have they been able to make reparations 
to the victims.316 Perhaps most alarmingly, there is cause to wonder, par-
ticularly on the basis of the Voluntary Principles example, whether or not 
the use of these mechanisms may actually perpetuate the conceptual and 
practical conflation of private and public coercive power. 
CONCLUSION: A METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION 
From the perspective of Campesino and Indigenous communities in 
Peru, there are a range of potential human rights issues that arise in do-
mestic and international law as a result of transnational corporate re-
source extraction. These include communities’ right to land, free prior 
and informed consultation—and perhaps even consent to extractive ac-
tivity—and an equitable share in the benefits of resource extraction.317 
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However, the Peruvian State, under the pressure of capital exporting 
countries and international financial institutions,318 has institutionalized 
the primacy of foreign investors’ rights in the form of increased property 
rights and the protection of investment rights. In this context, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights concluded that the basic land, 
social, and economic rights of Campesino and Indigenous Communities 
in Peru are being systematically violated by laws and practices that pro-
mote resource extraction and free trade.319 A broad and powerful social 
movement has been consolidated in response.320 This movement finds its 
expression in the interconnected work of certain NGOs; community or-
ganizations; and formal and informal transnational networks of con-
cerned citizens, activists, and academics; as well as in protest marches 
and road blockades.321 In response to this social movement and its de-
mands, the Peruvian State and mining companies have frequently resort-
ed to the use of coercive force. 
In this context, this case study of the Forza security company has un-
dertaken a particular methodological approach. First, it explored the legal 
arrangements that structure the exercise of coercive power in Peru and 
the formal and informal practices that characterize the security sector. In 
summary, these are (1) the increase in private security companies and 
officers relative to police officers, (2) the presence of private security 
companies, in some cases foreign owned, that specialize in providing 
services to mining companies and other companies in the resource ex-
traction sector, (3) the high levels of participation of police and military 
officers in private security companies, and (4) the formation of private 
security contracts between the police force and transnational mining 
companies. After analyzing the foregoing, this Article argued that public 
and private security services are being reorganized in accordance with a 
number of processes of privatization and that these services are increas-
ingly at the disposal of transnational mining companies. 
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Next, this Article investigated how these coercive resources are mobi-
lized in response to social movements working on human rights issues in 
the area of resource extraction. As such, the allegations in Majaz, 
GRUFIDES, and Business Track were summarized. Each of these cases 
points to the participation of Forza’s private security officers (as well as 
police officers in the Majaz case) in the systematic persecution of social 
movement leaders by private security companies.322 Further, attention 
was paid to the procedural dimensions of each case. This information is 
important because it indicates that, at least to date, none of the legal ef-
forts associated with each case have succeeded in bringing the perpetra-
tors of the alleged violations to account for their actions. 
Finally, this study identified the systems of national and international 
law that purport to govern the transnational companies associated with 
Forza and the human rights violations alleged. At the domestic level, the-
se consist of the Peruvian domestic legal system and the investor’s home 
state legal system.323 At the international level these consist of the human 
rights treaty system, the foreign investment regime, and voluntary corpo-
rate social responsibility mechanisms.324 Each of these mechanisms or 
systems of law was examined in terms of its applicability to the Forza 
case study and its potential efficacy in addressing the issue of impunity. 
This process helped to illuminate the operation, in the context of a par-
ticular case study, of the global gap in domestic law and the asymmetry 
of international law. It showed how the global gap results from a global 
pattern of deficiencies in the domestic regulation of transnational corpo-
rations. The claimants in the three cases reviewed argued that the Peruvi-
an justice system failed to properly investigate and sanction Forza. On 
the other hand, in many jurisdictions in the global North, the courts are 
likely to refuse to take jurisdiction over a lawsuit against Forza or one of 
its transnational corporate employers, as the case may be. Where a 
Northern court does take jurisdiction and proceed to trial, the experience 
to date is that the case will be settled out of court. Notwithstanding the 
positive dimensions of these settlements, this Article has argued that they 
also carry significant drawbacks; in particular it is argued that, as a sys-
tematic practice, they may amount to the privatization of the problem of 
impunity. At the same time, international law’s enforcement capacity is 
asymmetrical in that the legal regimes that protect the rights of the inves-
tors that employ Forza are enforceable, while the regimes that purport to 
protect the human rights of those who seek to bring claims against Forza 
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lack enforcement capacity. In this regard, this Article argued that the use 
of corporate social responsibility mechanisms by human rights claimants 
may ultimately produce outcomes that serve to perpetuate the privatiza-
tion of coercive power and to entrench the problem of impunity. 
In sum, this Article used a discrete case study to explore how the con-
ditions of impunity are maintained in the face of multiple systems of do-
mestic, transnational, and international legal regimes. It has posited that 
these regimes have failed in this regard because they are unable to con-
front impunity’s political and economic underpinnings, namely, the pri-
vatization of coercive force exercised in the service of transnational cor-
porate power. In this respect, the Forza case study articulates with the 
fundamental concern of Third World Approaches to International Law 
(“TWAIL”) scholars that the international legal system works to disem-
power Third World325 peoples and intensify global inequality.326 TWAIL 
scholars have argued that Third World social movements represent the 
“cutting edge of Third World resistance to antidemocratic and destruc-
tive development.”327 They have declared that international lawyers must 
“assist the ongoing global movement for global justice” in whatever 
ways possible.328 To this end, TWAIL scholars have called for the devel-
opment of “a theory of resistance” that would enable lawyers to respond 
appropriately.329 In response, this Article has worked toward developing 
a methodological approach to the study of the issue of impunity with the 
potential to inform theories of resistance. It endeavours to map the coer-
cive arrangements of power that threaten to curtail or even destroy Third 
World social movements. This mapping begins from the experience of 
particular movements, in particular political moments, and documents 
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the real life violations that threaten the political spaces that make these 
movements possible. 
This methodology is oriented toward identifying the meaningful and 
strategic legal tools that movements can avail themselves of under cur-
rent legal arrangements. It engages critically with national and interna-
tional systems of law in search of a reform agenda that places the issue of 
effective enforcement at the center of discussions on mechanisms for 
protecting rights. In this sense, the adoption of the lens of impunity is 
consistent with the call from critical international law scholars to focus 
on the outcomes of legal regimes before committing to their vocabularies 
and institutions.330 According to these scholars, the vocabularies and in-
stitutions of international law—particularly international human rights 
law—must themselves be sites of critique and contestation. They caution 
that if institutional outcomes do not change, then a change in vocabulary 
in favour of human rights will only subvert the capacity for transfor-
mation.331 
In this framework, this study’s methodology has been alert to the po-
tential strategic pitfalls of engaging with particular systems of law. The 
fact that well-intentioned engagements with certain mechanisms may 
have inadvertent consequences underscores the need for careful reflec-
tion on the broader legal and political consequences of these mecha-
nisms. Particularly, advocates must carefully consider the potential risks 
associated with the activation of privatized human rights mechanisms, 
such as voluntary corporate responsibility or private tort law regimes. 
The Forza case study suggests that it may be difficult to engage volun-
tary mechanisms without perpetuating or reinforcing the legal and practi-
cal arrangements of the privatized coercion that forms the structural un-
derpinnings of the human rights issues that advocates seek to address. In 
the same vein, this study questions the costs and benefits of the privat-
ized outcomes generated by home state tort law settlements. 
Of the many issues facing Third World social movements, the issue of 
systemic impunity for the criminal behavior perpetrated to benefit for-
eign investors deserves serious attention from progressive international 
lawyers. These circumstances constitute a moment where national and 
international systems of law fail to respond to protect the very existence 
of grassroots resistance to inequitable economic relations. Just as this is 
                                                                                                             
 330. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later, 22 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 12–13 (2009); see also David Kennedy, Professor of Law, Brown 
Univ., Address at the Ohio Northern Univ. Pettit Coll. of Law Kormendy Lecture: The 
Mystery of Global Governance (Jan. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/speeches/GlobalGovernance(2).htm. 
 331. Koskenniemi, supra note 330, at 13. 
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of deep concern, the persistence and tenacity of these movements against 
all odds suggests that these circumstances likewise represent a rare op-
portunity for change. 
 
